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Abstract—With the proliferation of training data, distributed
machine learning (DML) is becoming more competent for large-
scale learning tasks. However, privacy concerns have to be given
priority in DML, since training data may contain sensitive infor-
mation of users. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
ADMM-based DML framework with two novel features: First, we
remove the assumption commonly made in the literature that the
users trust the server collecting their data. Second, the framework
provides heterogeneous privacy for users depending on data’s
sensitive levels and servers’ trust degrees. The challenging issue is
to keep the accumulation of privacy losses over ADMM iterations
minimal. In the proposed framework, a local randomization
approach, which is differentially private, is adopted to provide
users with self-controlled privacy guarantee for the most sensitive
information. Further, the ADMM algorithm is perturbed through
a combined noise-adding method, which simultaneously preserves
privacy for users’ less sensitive information and strengthens
the privacy protection of the most sensitive information. We
provide detailed analyses on the performance of the trained
model according to its generalization error. Finally, we conduct
extensive experiments using real-world datasets to validate the
theoretical results and evaluate the classification performance of
the proposed framework.
Index Terms—Distributed machine learning, privacy preserva-
tion, ADMM, generalization error.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the era of big data, distributed machine learning (DML)is increasingly applied in various areas of our daily lives,
especially with proliferation of training data. Typical applica-
tions of DML include machine-aided prescription [1], natural
language processing [2], recommender systems [3], to name
a few. Compared with the traditional single-machine model,
DML is more competent for large-scale learning tasks due to
its scalability and robustness to faults. The alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM), as a commonly-used parallel
computing approach in optimization community, is a simple
but efficient algorithm for multiple servers to collaboratively
solve learning problems [4]. Our DML framework also use
ADMM as the underlying algorithm.
However, privacy is a significant issue that has to be consid-
ered in DML. In many machine learning tasks, users’ data for
training the prediction model contains sensitive information,
such as genotypes, salaries, and political orientations. For
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example, if we adopt DML methods to predict HIV-1 infection
[5], the data used for protein-protein interactions identification
mainly includes patients’ information about their proteins,
labels indicating whether they are HIV-1 infected or not,
and other kinds of health data. Such information, especially
the labels, is extremely sensitive for the patients. Moreover,
there exist potential risks of privacy disclosure. On one hand,
when users report their data to servers, illegal parties can
eavesdrop the data transmission processes or penetrate the
servers to steal reported data. On the other, the communicated
information between servers, which is required to train a
common prediction model, can also disclose users’ private
data. If these disclosure risks are not properly controlled, users
would refuse to contribute their data to servers even though
DML may bring convenience for them.
Various privacy-preserving solutions have been proposed
in the literature. Differential privacy (DP) [6] is one of the
standard non-cryptographical approaches and has been applied
in distributed computing scenarios [7–10]. Other schemes
which are not DP-preserving can be found in [11–13]. In
addition, privacy-aware machine learning problems [14–17]
have attracted a lot of attentions, and many researchers have
proposed ADMM-based solutions [18–20]. However, there ex-
ists an underlying assumption in most privacy-aware schemes
that the data contributors trust the servers collecting their data.
This trustworthy assumption may lead to privacy disclosure in
many cases. For instance, when the server is penetrated by an
adversary, the information obtained by the adversary may be
the users’ original private data.
Moreover, most existing schemes provide the same privacy
guarantee for the entire data sample of a user though different
data pieces are likely to have distinct sensitive levels. In the ex-
ample of HIV-1 infection prediction [5] mentioned above, it is
obvious that the label indicating HIV-1 infected or uninfected
is more sensitive than other health data. Thus, the data pieces
with higher sensitive levels should obtain stronger protection.
On the other hand, as claimed in [7], different servers present
diverse trust degrees to users due to the distinct permissions
to users’ data. The servers having no direct connection with
a user, compared with the server collecting his/her data, may
be less trustworthy. Here, the user would require that the less
trustworthy servers obtain his/her information under stronger
privacy preservation. Therefore, we will investigate a privacy-
aware DML framework that preserves heterogeneous privacy,
where users’ data pieces with distinct sensitive levels can
obtain different privacy guarantee against servers of diverse
trust degrees.
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2One challenging issue is to reduce the accumulation of
privacy losses over ADMM iterations as much as possible,
especially for the privacy guarantee of the most sensitive data
pieces. Most existing ADMM-based private DML frameworks
preserve privacy by perturbing the intermediate results shared
by servers. Since each intermediate result is computed with
users’ original data, its release will disclose part of private
information, implying that the privacy loss may increase as
iterations proceed. Moreover, these private DML frameworks
only provide the same privacy guarantee for all data pieces.
In addition to intermediate information perturbation, original
data randomization methods can be combined to provide
heterogeneous privacy protection. However, such an approach
introduces coupled uncertainties into the classification model.
The lack of uncertainty decoupling methods leads to the
performance quantification a challenging task.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving distributed
machine learning (PDML) framework to settle these challeng-
ing issues. After removing the trustworthy servers assumption,
we incorporate the users’ data reporting into the DML process,
which forms a two-phase training scheme together with the
distributed computing process. For privacy preservation, we
adopt different approaches in the two phases. In Phase 1, a user
first leverages a local randomization approach to obfuscate the
most sensitive data pieces and sends the randomized version to
a server. This technique provides the user with self-controlled
privacy guarantee for the most sensitive information. Further,
in Phase 2, multiple servers collaboratively train a common
prediction model and there, they use a combined noise-
adding method to perturb the communicated messages, which
preserves privacy for users’ less sensitive data pieces. Also,
such perturbation strengthens the privacy preservation of data
pieces with the highest sensitive level. For the performance of
the PDML framework, we analyze the generalization error of
current classifiers trained by different servers.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
1) A two-phase PDML framework is proposed to provide
heterogeneous privacy protection in DML, where users’ data
pieces obtain different privacy guarantees depending on their
sensitive levels and servers’ trust degrees.
2) In Phase 1, we design a local randomization approach,
which preserves DP for the users’ most sensitive information.
In Phase 2, a combined noise-adding method is devised to
compensate the privacy protection of other data pieces.
3) The convergence property of the proposed ADMM-based
privacy-aware algorithm is analyzed. We also give a theoretical
bound of the difference between the generalization error of
trained classifiers and the ideal optimal classifier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related
works are discussed in Section II. We provide some prelim-
inaries and formulate the problem in Section III. Section IV
presents the designed privacy-preserving framework, and the
performance is analyzed in Section V. In order to validate the
classification performance, we use multiple real-world datasets
and conduct experiments in Section VI. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper. A preliminary version [21] of this paper
was accepted for presentation at IEEE CDC 2019. This paper
contains a different privacy-preserving approach with a fully
distributed ADMM setting, full proofs of the main results, and
more experimental results.
II. RELATED WORKS
As one of the important applications of distributed op-
timization, DML has received widespread attentions from
researchers. Besides ADMM schemes, many distributed ap-
proaches have been proposed in the literature, e.g., subgradi-
ent descent methods [22], local message-passing algorithms
[23], adaptive diffusion mechanisms [24], and dual averaging
approaches [25]. Compared with these approaches, ADMM
schemes achieve faster empirical convergence [26], making it
more suitable for large-scale DML tasks.
For privacy-preserving problems, cryptographic techniques
[27–29] are often used to protect information from being
inferred when the key is unknown. In particular, homomorphic
encryption methods [28], [29] allow untrustworthy servers to
calculate with encrypted data, and this approach has been ap-
plied in an ADMM scheme [20]. Nevertheless, such schemes
unavoidably bring extra computation and communication over-
heads. Another commonly used approach to preserve privacy
is random value perturbation [6], [30], [31]. DP has been
increasingly acknowledged as the de facto criterion for non-
encryption-based data privacy. This approach requires less
costs but still provides strong privacy guarantee, though there
exist tradeoffs between privacy and performance [7].
In recent years, random value perturbation-based ap-
proaches have been widely used to address privacy protection
in distributed computing, especially in consensus problems
[32]. For instance, [7–9], [11–13] provide privacy-preserving
average consensus paradigms, where the mechanisms in [7–9]
provide DP guarantee. Moreover, for a maximum consensus
algorithm, [10] gives a differentially private mechanism. Since
these solutions mainly focus on simple statistical analysis (e.g.,
computation of average and maximum elements), there may
exist difficulties in directly applying them to DML.
Privacy-preserving machine learning problems have also at-
tracted a lot of attention recently. Under centralized scenarios,
Chaudhuri et al. [14] proposed a DP solution for an empirical
risk minimization problem by perturbing the objective function
with well-designed noise. For privacy-aware DML, Han et al.
[33] also gave a differentially private mechanism, where the
underlying distributed approach is subgradient descent. The
works [15] and [16] present dynamic DP schemes for ADMM-
based DML, where privacy guarantee is provided in each
iteration. However, if a privacy violator uses the published
information in all iterations to make inference, there will be
no privacy guarantee. In addition, an obfuscated stochastic
gradient method via correlated perturbations was proposed
in [17], though it cannot provide DP preservation. Different
from these works, in this paper we remove the trustworthy
servers assumption. Moreover, we take into consideration
the distinct sensitive levels of data pieces and the diverse
trust degrees of servers, and propose the PDML framework
providing heterogeneous privacy preservation.
3Fig. 1: Illustration of the DML framework
III. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we introduce the overall computation frame-
work of DML and the ADMM algorithm used there. Moreover,
the privacy-preserving problem for the framework is formu-
lated with the definition of local differential privacy.
A. System Setting
We consider a collaborative DML framework to carry out
classification problems based on data collected from a large
number of users. Fig. 1 gives a schematic diagram. There
are two parties involved: Users (or data contributors) and
computing servers. The DML’s goal is to train a classification
model based on data of all users. It has two phases of data
collection and distributed computation, called Phase 1 and
Phase 2, respectively. In Phase 1, each user sends his/her data
to the server, which is responsible to collect all the data from
the user’s group. In Phase 2, each computing server utilizes
a distributed computing approach to cooperatively train the
classifier through information interaction with other servers.
The proposed DML framework is based on the one in [7],
but the learning tasks are much more complex than the basic
statistical analysis considered by [7].
Network Model. Consider n ≥ 2 computing servers par-
ticipating in the framework where the ith server is denoted by
si. We use an undirected and connected graph G = (S, E)
to describe the underlying communication topology, where
S = {si | i = 1, 2, . . . , n} is the servers set and E ⊆ S ×S is
the set of communication links between servers. The number
of communication links in G is denoted by E, i.e., E = |E|. Let
the set of neighbor servers of si be Ni = {sl ∈ S | (si, sl) ∈
E}. The degree of server si is denoted by Ni = |Ni|.
Different servers collect data from different groups of users,
and thus all users can be divided into n distinct groups. The ith
group of users, whose data is collected by server si, is denoted
by the set Ui, and mi = |Ui| is the number of users in Ui. Each
user j ∈ Ui has a data sample di,j = (xi,j , yi,j) ∈ X × Y ⊆
Rd+1, which is composed of a feature vector xi,j ∈ X ⊆ Rd
and the corresponding label yi,j ∈ Y ⊆ R. In this paper,
we consider a binary-classification problem. That is, there are
two types of labels as yi,j ∈ {−1, 1}. Suppose that all data
samples di,j ,∀i, j, are drawn from an underlying distribution
P , which is unknown to the servers. Here, the learning goal is
that the classifier trained with limited data samples can match
the ideal model trained with known P as much as possible.
B. Classification Problem and ADMM Algorithm
We first introduce the classification problem solved by the
two-phase DML framework. Let w : X → Y be the trained
classification model. The trained classifier w should guarantee
that the accuracy of mapping any feature vector xi,j (sampled
from the distribution P) to its correct label yi,j is high. We
employ the method of regularized empirical risk minimization,
which is a commonly used approach to find an appropriate
classifier [34]. Denote the classifier trained by server si as
wi ∈ Rd. The objective function (or the empirical risk) of the
minimization problem is defined as
J({wi}i∈S) :=
n∑
i=1
[
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j) +
a
n
N(wi)
]
, (1)
where ` : R × R → R is the loss function measuring
the performance of the trained classifier wi. The regularizer
N(wi) is introduced to mitigate overfitting, and a > 0 is a
constant. We take a bounded classifier class W ⊂ Rd such
that wi ∈ W,∀i. For the loss function `(·) and the regularizer
N(·), we introduce the following assumptions [14] [15].
Assumption 1. The loss function `(·) is convex and doubly
differentiable in w. In particular, `(·), ∂`(·)∂w and ∂`
2(·)
∂w2 are
bounded over the class W as
|`(·)| ≤ c1,
∣∣∣∣∂`(·)∂w
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c2, ∣∣∣∣∂`2(·)∂w2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c3,
where c1, c2 and c3 are positive constants. Moreover, it holds
∂`2(y,wTx)
∂w2 =
∂`2(−y,wTx)
∂w2 .
Assumption 2. The regularizer N(·) is doubly differentiable
and strongly convex with parameter κ > 0, i.e., ∀w1,w2 ∈ W ,
N(w1)−N(w2) ≥ ∇N(w1)T(w2 −w1) + κ
2
‖w2 −w1‖22, (2)
where ∇N(·) indicates the gradient with respect to w.
We note that J({wi}i∈S) in (1) can be separated into n
different parts, where each part is the objective function of
the local minimization problem to be solved by each server.
The objective function of server si is
Ji(wi) :=
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j) +
a
n
N(wi). (3)
Since wi is trained based on the data of the ith group of
users, it may only partially reflect data characteristics. To find
a common classifier taking account of all participating users,
we place a global consensus constraint in the minimization
problem, as wi = wl,∀si, sl ∈ S. However, since we use a
connected graph to describe the interaction between servers,
we have to utilize a local consensus constraint:
wi = zil, wl = zil, ∀(si, sl) ∈ E , (4)
where zil ∈ Rd is an auxiliary variable enforcing consensus
between neighbor servers si and sl. Obviously, (4) also implies
global consensus. We can now write the whole regularized
empirical risk minimization problem as follows [35].
Problem 1.
min
{wi},{zi,l}
n∑
i=1
[
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j) +
a
n
N(wi)
]
(5)
s.t. wi = zil, wl = zil, ∀(si, sl) ∈ E . (6)
Next, we establish a compact form of Problem 1. Let w :=
[wT1 · · ·wTn ]T ∈ Rnd and z ∈ R2Ed be vectors aggregating
all classifiers wi and auxiliary variables zil, respectively. To
4transfer all local consensus constraints into a matrix form, we
introduce two block matrices A1, A2 ∈ R2Ed×nd, which are
partitioned into 2E×n submatrices with dimension d×d. For
the communication link (si, sl) ∈ E , if zil is the mth block of
z, then the (m, i)th submatrix of A1 and (m, l)th submatrix
of A2 are the d × d identity matrix Id; otherwise, these
submatrices are the d × d zero matrix 0d. We write J(w) =∑n
i=1 J(wi), A := [A
T
1A
T
2 ]
T, and B := [−I2Ed −I2Ed]T.
Then, Problem 1 can be written in a compact form as
min
w,z
J(w) (7)
s.t. Aw +Bz = 0. (8)
For solving this problem we introduce the fully distributed
ADMM algorithm from [26]. The augmented Lagrange func-
tion associated with (7) and (8) is given by L(w, z,λ) :=
J(w) + λT(Aw + Bz) + β2 ‖Aw + Bz‖22, where λ ∈ R4Ed
is the dual variable (w is correspondingly called the primal
variable) and β ∈ R is the penalty parameter.
At iteration t + 1, the solved optimal auxiliary variable z
satisfies the relation∇L(w(t+1), z(t+1),λ(t)) = 0. Through
some simple transformation, we have BTλ(t + 1) = 0. Let
λ = [ξTζT]T with ξ, ζ ∈ R2Ed. If we set the initial value of
λ to ξ(0) = −ζ(0), we have ξ(t) = −ζ(t),∀t ≥ 0. Thus, we
can obtain the complete dual variable λ by solving ξ. Let
L+ :=
1
2
(A1+A2)
T(A1+A2), L− :=
1
2
(A1−A2)T(A1−A2).
Define a new dual variable γ := (A1 − A2)Tξ ∈ Rnd.
Through the simplification process in [26], we obtain the fully
distributed ADMM for solving Problem 1, which is composed
of the following iterations:
∇J(w(t+ 1)) + γ(t) + β(L+ + L−)w(t+ 1)− βL+w(t) = 0,
γ(t+ 1)− γ(t)− βL−w(t+ 1) = 0.
Note that γ is also a compact vector of all local dual variables
γi ∈ Rd for si ∈ S, i.e., γ = [γT1 · · ·γTn ]T.
The above ADMM iterations can be separated into n
different parts, which are solved by the n different servers. At
iteration t+ 1, the information used by server si to update a
new primal variable wi(t+1) includes users’ data di,j ,∀j, cur-
rent classifiers {wl(t) | l ∈ Ni
⋃{i}} and dual variable γi(t).
The local augmented Lagrange function Li(wi,wi(t),γi(t))
associated with the primal variable update is given by
Li(wi, {wl(t)}l∈Ni ⋃{i},γi(t))
:= Ji(wi) + γ
T
i (t)wi + β
∑
l∈Ni
∥∥∥∥wi − 12(wi(t) + wl(t))
∥∥∥∥2
2
.
At each iteration, server si will update its primal variable
wi(t+ 1) and dual variable γi(t+ 1) as follows:
wi(t+ 1) = arg min
wi
Li(wi, {wl(t)}l∈Ni⋃{i},γi(t)), (9)
γi(t+ 1) = γi(t) + β
∑
l∈Ni
(wi(t+ 1)−wl(t+ 1)) . (10)
Clearly, in (9) and (10), the information communicated be-
tween computing servers is the newly updated classifiers.
C. Privacy-preserving Problem
In this subsection, we introduce the privacy-preserving
problem in the DML framework. The private information to
be preserved is first defined, followed by the introduction of
privacy violators and information used for privacy inference.
Further, we present the objectives of the two phases.
Private information. For users, both the feature vectors
and the labels of the data samples contain their sensitive
information. The private information contained in the feature
vectors may be the ID, gender, general health data and so
on. However, the labels may indicate, for example, whether a
patient contracts a disease (e.g., HIV-1 infected) or whether a
user has a special identity (e.g., a member of a certain group).
We can see that compared with the feature vectors, the labels
may be more sensitive for the users. In this paper, we consider
that the labels of users’ data are the most sensitive information,
which should be protected with priority and obtain stronger
privacy guarantee than that of feature vectors.
Privacy attacks. All computing servers are viewed as
untrustworthy potential privacy violators desiring to infer the
sensitive information contained in users’ data. In the mean-
time, different servers present distinct trust degrees to users.
User j ∈ Ui divides the potential privacy violators into two
types. The server si, collecting user j’s data directly, is the
first type. Other servers sl ∈ S, sl 6= si, having no direct
connection with user j, are the second type. Compared with
server si, other servers are less trustworthy for user j. To
conduct privacy inference, the first type of privacy violators
leverages user j’s reported data while the second type can
utilize only the intermediate information shared by servers.
Privacy protections in Phases 1 & 2. Since the label of
user j ∈ Ui is the most sensitive information, its original
value should not be disclosed to any servers including server
si. Thus, during the data reporting process in Phase 1, user
j must obfuscate the private label in his/her local device.
For the less sensitive feature vector, considering that server
si is more trustworthy, user j can choose to transmit the
original version to that server. Nevertheless, the user is still
unwilling to disclose the raw feature vector to servers with
lower trust degrees. Hence, in this paper, when server si
interacts with other servers to find a common classifier in
Phase 2, the released information about user j’s data will be
further processed before communication.
More specifically, in Phase 1, to obfuscate the labels, we
use a local randomization approach, whose privacy-preserving
property will be measured by local differential privacy (LDP)
[30]. LDP is developed from differential privacy (DP), which
is originally defined for trustworthy databases to publish
aggregated private information [6]. The privacy preservation
idea of DP is that for any two neighbor databases differing
in one record (e.g., one user selects to report or not to report
his/her data to the server) as input, a randomized mechanism is
adopted to guarantee the two outputs to have high similarity
so that privacy violators cannot identify the different record
with high confidence. Since there is no trusted server for data
collection in our setting, users locally perturb their original
labels and report noisy versions to the servers.
5Fig. 2: Workflow of the PDML framework
To this end, we define a randomized mechanism M :
Rd+1 → Rd+1, which takes a data sample as input and outputs
its noisy version. The definition of LDP is given as follows.
Definition 1. (-LDP). Given  > 0, a randomized mech-
anism M(·) preserves -LDP if for any two data samples
d1 = (x1, y1) and d2 = (x2, y2) satisfying x2 = x1 and
y2 = −y1, and any observation set O ⊆ Range(M), it holds
Pr[M(d1) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr[M(d2) ∈ O]. (11)
In (11), the parameter  is called the privacy preserving
degree (PPD), which describes the strength of privacy guaran-
tee of M(·). A smaller  implies stronger privacy guarantee.
This is because smaller  means that the two outputs M(d1)
and M(d2) are closer, making it more difficult for privacy
violators to infer the difference in d1 and d2 (i.e., y1 and y2).
D. System Overview
In this paper, we propose the PDML framework, where
users can obtain heterogeneous privacy protection. The hetero-
geneity is characterized by two aspects: i) When a user faces
a privacy violator, his/her data pieces with distinct sensitive
levels (i.e., the feature vector and the label) obtain different
privacy guarantees; ii) for one type of private data piece,
the privacy protection provided by the framework is stronger
against privacy violators with low trust degrees than those with
higher trust degrees. Particularly, in our approach, the privacy
preservation strength of users’ labels is controlled by the users.
Moreover, a modified ADMM algorithm is proposed to meet
the heterogeneous privacy protection requirement.
The workflow of the proposed PDML framework is illus-
trated in Fig. 2. Some details are explained below.
1) In Phase 1, a user first appropriately randomizes the
private label, and then sends the noisy label and the origi-
nal feature vector to a computing server. The randomization
approach used here determines the PPD of the label.
2) In Phase 2, multiple computing servers collaboratively
train a common classifier based on their collected data. To
protect privacy of feature vectors against less trustworthy
servers, we further use a combined noise-adding method to
perturb the ADMM algorithm, which also strengthens the
privacy guarantee of users’ labels.
3) The performance of the trained classifiers is analyzed in
terms of their generalization errors. To decompose the effects
of uncertainties introduced in the two phases, we modify the
loss function in Problem 1. We finally quantify the difference
between the generalization error of trained classifiers and that
of the ideal optimal classifier.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRAMEWORK DESIGN
In this section, we introduce the privacy-preserving ap-
proaches used in Phases 1 and 2, and analyze their properties.
A. Privacy-Preserving Approach in Phase 1
In this subsection, we propose an appropriate approach
used in Phase 1 to provide privacy preservation for the most
sensitive labels. In particular, it is controlled by users and will
not be weakened in Phase 2.
We adopt the idea of randomized response (RR) [30]
to obfuscate the users’ labels. Originally, RR was used to
set plausible deniability for respondents when they answer
survey questions about sensitive topics (e.g., HIV-1 infected
or uninfected). When using RR, respondents only have a
certain probability to answer questions according to their
true situations, making the server unable to determine with
certainty whether the reported answers are true.
In our setting, user j ∈ Ui randomizes the label through RR
and sends the noisy version to server si. This is done by the
randomized mechanism M defined below.
Definition 2. For p ∈ (0, 12 ), the randomized mechanism
M with input data sample di,j = (xi,j , yi,j) is given by
M(di,j) = (xi,j , y
′
i,j), where
y′i,j =

1, with probability p
−1, with probability p
yi,j , with probability 1− 2p.
(12)
In the above definition, p is the randomization probability
controlling the level of data obfuscation. Obviously, a larger
p implies higher uncertainty on the reported label, making it
harder for the server to learn the true label.
Denote the output M(di,j) as d′i,j , i.e., d
′
i,j = M(di,j) =
(xi,j , y
′
i,j). After the randomization, d
′
i,j will be transmitted
to the server. In this case, server si can use only d′i,j to train
the classifier, and the released information about the true label
yi,j in Phase 2 is computed based on d′i,j . This implies that
once d′i,j is reported to the server, no more information about
the true label yi,j will be released. In this paper, we set the
randomization probability p in (12) as
p =
1
1 + e
, (13)
where  > 0. The following theorem gives the privacy-
preserving property of the randomized mechanism in Defini-
tion 2, justifying this choice of p from the viewpoint of LDP.
Proposition 1. Under (13), the randomized mechanism
M(di,j) preserves -LDP for di,j .
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 clearly indicates that the users can tune the
randomization probability according to their privacy demands.
This can be seen as given a randomization probability p,
by (13), the PPD  provided by M(di,j) is  = ln 1−pp .
Obviously, a larger randomization probability leads to smaller
PPD, indicating stronger privacy guarantee.
If all data samples di,j ,∀i, j, drawn from the distribution P
are randomized through M , the noisy data d′i,j ,∀i, j, can be
considered to be obtained from a new distribution P, which
is related to the PPD . Note that P is also an unknown
distribution due to the unknown P .
6B. Privacy-Preserving Approach in Phase 2
To deal with less trustworthy servers in Phase 2, we devise
a combined noise-adding approach to simultaneously preserve
privacy for users’ feature vectors and enhance the privacy guar-
antee of users’ labels. We first adopt the method of objective
function perturbation [14]. That is, before solving Problem 1,
the servers perturb the objective function J({wi}i∈S) with
random noises. For server si ∈ S, the perturbed objective
function is given by
J˜i(wi) := Ji(wi) +
1
n
ηTi wi, (14)
where Ji(wi) is the local objective function given in (3), and
ηi ∈ Rd is a bounded random noise with arbitrary distribution.
Let R be the bound of noises ηi,∀i, namely, ‖ηi‖∞ ≤ R.
Denote the sum of J˜i(wi) as J˜({wi}i∈S) :=
∑n
i=1 J˜i(wi).
Limitation of objective function perturbation. We remark
that in our setting, the objective function perturbation in (14)
is not sufficient to provide reliable privacy guarantee. This is
because each server publishes current classifier multiple times
and each publication utilizes users’ reported data. Note that
in the more centralized setting of [14], the classifier is only
published once. More specifically, according to (9), wi(t +
1) is the solution to ∇Li(wi, {wl(t)}l∈Ni⋃{i},γi(t)) =
0. In this case, it holds ∇J˜i(wi(t + 1)) = −γi(t) +
β
∑
l∈Ni (wi(t) + wl(t)− 2wi(t+ 1)). As (10) shows, the
dual variable γi(t) can be deduced from updated classifiers.
Thus, if si’s neighbor servers have access to wi(t + 1)
and {wl(t) | l ∈ {i}
⋃Ni}, then they can easily compute
∇J˜i(wi(t+ 1)).
We should highlight that multiple releases of∇J˜i(wi(t+1))
increase the risk of users’ privacy disclosure. This can be ex-
plained as follows. First, note that∇J˜i(wi) = ∇Ji(wi)+ 1nηi,
where ∇Ji(wi) contains users’ private information. The goal
of ηi-perturbation is to protect ∇Ji(wi) not to be derived
directly by other servers. However, after publishing an updated
classifier wi(t+ 1), server si releases a new gradient ∇J˜i(·).
Since the noise ηi is fixed for all iterations, each release
of ∇J˜i(·) means disclosing more information about ∇Ji(·).
In particular, we have ∇J˜i(wi(t + 1)) − ∇J˜i(wi(t)) =
∇Ji(wi(t+1))−∇Ji(wi(t)). That is, the effect of the added
noise ηi can be cancelled by integrating the gradients of
objective functions at different time instants.
Modified ADMM by primal variable perturbation. To
ensure appropriate privacy preservation in Phase 2, we adopt
an extra perturbation method, which sets obstructions for
other servers to obtain the gradient ∇Ji(·). Specifically, after
deriving classifier wi(t), server si first perturbs wi(t) with a
Gaussian noise θi(t) whose variance is decaying as iterations
proceed, and then sends a noisy version of wi(t) to neighbor
servers. This is denoted by w˜i(t) := wi(t) + θi(t), where
θi(t) ∼ N (0, ρt−1V 2i Id) with decaying rate 0 < ρ < 1.
The local augmented Lagrange function associated with ηi-
perturbed objective function J˜i(wi) in (14) is given by
L˜i(wi, {w˜l(t)}l∈Ni ⋃{i},γi(t))
:= J˜i(wi) + γ
T
i (t)wi + β
∑
l∈Ni
∥∥∥∥wi − 12(w˜i(t) + w˜l(t))
∥∥∥∥2
2
.
We then introduce the perturbed version of the ADMM
algorithm in (9) and (10) as
wi(t+ 1) = arg min
wi
L˜i(wi, {w˜l(t)}l∈Ni⋃{i},γi(t)), (15)
w˜i(t+ 1) = wi(t+ 1) + θi(t+ 1), (16)
γi(t+ 1) = γi(t) + β
∑
l∈Ni
(w˜i(t+ 1)− w˜l(t+ 1)) . (17)
At iteration t+ 1, a new classifier wi(t+ 1) is first obtained
by solving ∇L˜i(wi, w˜i(t),γi(t)) = 0. Then, server si will
send w˜i(t + 1) out and wait for the updated classifiers from
neighbor servers. At the end of an iteration, the server will
update the dual variable γi(t+ 1).
C. Discussions
We now discuss the effectiveness of the primal variable
perturbation. It is emphasized that at each iteration, si only
releases a small amount of information about ∇J˜i(wi(t +
1)) through the communicated w˜i(t + 1). Although γi(t)
and {w˜l(t) | l ∈ {i}
⋃Ni} are known to si’s neighbors,
∇J˜i(wi(t + 1)) cannot be directly computed due to the
unknown θi(t+1). More specifically, observe that by (15), we
have ∇J˜i(wi(t+ 1)) = −γi(t) +β
∑
l∈Ni (w˜i(t) + w˜l(t))−
2βNi(w˜i(t+ 1)− θi(t+ 1)), where Ni is the degree of si.
On the other hand, using available information, other servers
can compute only ∇J˜i(w˜i(t + 1)), i.e., the gradient with
respect to perturbed classifier w˜i(t+1). We have ∇J˜i(w˜i(t+
1)) = −γi(t) − β
∑
l∈Ni [2w˜i(t+ 1)− (w˜i(t) + w˜l(t))].
Thus, we obtain ∇J˜i(w˜i(t+1))−∇J˜i(w˜i(t)) = ∇Ji(wi(t+
1)) − ∇Ji(wi(t)) − 2βNi(θi(t + 1) − θi(t)). Hence, due to
θi, it would not be helpful for inferring ∇Ji(·) to integrate
the gradients of the objective functions at different iterations.
We should also observe that since limt→∞ θi(t + 1) = 0,
∇J˜i(wi(t + 1)) can be derived when t → ∞. Moreover, it
is clear that the relation ∇J˜i(w˜i(t + 1)) − ∇J˜i(w˜i(t)) =
∇Ji(wi(t + 1)) − ∇Ji(wi(t)) holds for t → ∞. However,
∇J˜i(·) is the result of∇Ji(·) under ηi-perturbation. Moreover,
due to the local consensus constraint (4), the trained classifiers
wi(t) may not have significant differences when t→∞. Such
limited information is not sufficient for privacy violators to
infer ∇Ji(·) with high confidence.
Differential privacy analysis. We remark that in our
scheme, the noise ηi added to the objective function provides
underlying privacy protection in Phase 2. Even if privacy
violators make inference with published w˜i in all iterations,
the disclosed information is users’ reported data plus extra
noise perturbation. If the objective function perturbation is
removed, the primal variable perturbation method cannot
provide DP guarantee when t → ∞. It is proved in [15]
and [16] that the wi-perturbation in (16) preserves dynamic
DP. According to the composition theorem of DP [6], the
PPD will increase (indicating weaker privacy guarantee) when
other servers obtain the perturbed classifiers w˜i of multiple
iterations. In particular, if the perturbed classifiers in all
iterations are used for inference, the PPD will be∞, implying
no privacy guarantee any more.
7Remark 1. The objective function perturbation given in (14)
preserves the so-called (p, δp)-DP [36]. Also, according to
[14], the perturbation in (14) preserves 2-DP if ηi has density
f(ηi) =
1
ν e
−2‖ηi‖ with normalizing parameter ν. Note that
the noise with this density is not bounded, which is not
consistent with our setting. Although we use a bounded noise,
this kind of perturbation still provides (p, δp)-DP guarantee,
which is a relaxed form of pure p-DP.
Strengthened privacy guarantee. For users’ labels, the
privacy guarantee in Phase 2 is stronger than that of Phase 1.
Since differential privacy is immune to post-processing [6],
the PPD  in Phase 1 will not increase during the iterations
of the ADMM algorithm executed in Phase 2. However, such
immunity is established based on a strong assumption that
there is no limit to the capability of privacy violators. In
our considered problem, this assumption is satisfied when all
servers can have access to user j’s reported data d′i,j , which
may not be realistic. Hence, in our problem setting, one server
(i.e., server si) obtains d′i,j while other servers can access only
the classifiers trained with users’ reported data.
Remark 2. The (p, δp)-DP guarantee is provided for users’
feature vectors. Thus, in Phase 2, the sensitive information
in those vectors is not disclosed much to the servers with
lower trust degrees. For the labels, they obtain extra (p, δp)-
DP preservation in Phase 2. Since the privacy-preserving
scheme in Phase 1 preserves -DP for the labels, the released
information about them in Phase 2 provides stronger privacy
guarantee under the joint effect of -DP in Phase 1 and
(p, δp)-DP in Phase 2. We will investigate the joint privacy-
preserving degree in the future.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the clas-
sifiers trained by the proposed PDML framework. Note that
three different uncertainties are introduced into the ADMM
algorithm, and these uncertainties are coupled together. The
difficulty in analyzing the performance lies in decomposing
the effects of the three uncertainties and quantifying the role
of each uncertainty. Further, it is also challenging to achieve
perturbations mitigation on the trained classifiers, especially
to mitigate the influence of users’ wrong labels.
Here, we first give the definition of generalization error
as the metric on the performance of the trained classifiers.
Then, we establish a modified version of the loss function `(·),
which simultaneously achieves uncertainty decomposition and
mitigation of label obfuscation. We finally derive a theoretical
bound for the difference between the generalization error of
trained classifiers and that of the ideal optimal classifier.
A. Performance Metric
To measure the quality of trained classifiers, we use gen-
eralization error for analysis, which describes the expected
error of a classifier on future predictions [37]. Recall that
users’ data samples are drawn from the unknown distribution
P . The generalization error of a classifier w is defined as
the expectation of w’s loss function with respect to P as
E(x,y)∼P
[
`(y,wTx)
]
. Further, define the regularized gener-
alization error by
JP(w) := E(x,y)∼P
[
`(y,wTx)
]
+
a
n
N(w). (18)
We denote the classifier minimizing JP(w) as w?, i.e., w? :=
arg minw∈W JP(w). We call w? the ideal optimal classifier.
Here, JP(w?) is the reference regularized generalization
error under the classifier class W and the used loss function
`(·). The trained classifier can be viewed as a good predictor if
it achieves generalization error close to JP(w?). Thus, as the
performance metric of the classifiers, we use the difference
between the generalization error of trained classifiers and
JP(w?). The difference is denoted as ∆JP(w), that is,
∆JP(w) := JP(w)− JP(w?).
Furthermore, to measure the performance of the classifiers
trained by different servers at multiple iterations, we introduce
a comprehensive metric. First, considering that the classi-
fiers wi solved by server si at different iterations may be
different until the consensus constraint (4) is satisfied, we
define a classifier wi(t) to aggregate wi in the first t rounds
as wi(t) := 1t
∑t
k=1wi(k), where wi(k) is the obtained
classifier by solving (15). Moreover, due to the diversity of
users’ reported data, the classifiers solved by different servers
may also differ (especially in the initial iterations). For this
reason, we will later study the accumulated difference among
the n servers, that is,
∑n
i=1 ∆JP(wi(t)).
B. Modified Loss Function in ADMM Algorithm
To mitigate the effect of label obfuscation executed in
Phase 1, we make some modification to the loss function `(·)
in Problem 1. We use the noisy labels and the corresponding
PPD  in Phase 1 to adjust the loss function `(·) in (5). (Note
that other parts of Problem 1 are not affected by the noisy
labels.) Define the modified loss function ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) by
ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) :=
e`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j)− `(−y′i,j ,wTi xi,j)
e − 1 . (19)
This function has the following properties.
Proposition 2. (i) ˆ`(y′i,j ,wTi xi,j , ) is an unbiased estimate
of `(yi,j ,wTi xi,j) as
Ey′i,j
[
ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , )
]
= `(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j). (20)
(ii) ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz
constant
cˆ2 :=
e + 1
e − 1c2, (21)
where c2 is the bound of
∣∣∣∂`(·)∂wi ∣∣∣ given in Assumption 1.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Now, we make server si use ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) in (19) as
the loss function. Thus, the objective function in (3) must be
replaced with the one as follows:
Ĵi(wi) :=
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) +
a
n
N(wi). (22)
Similar to J({wi}i∈S) in (1), we denote the objective func-
tion with the modified loss function as Ĵ({wi}i∈S) :=
8∑n
i=n Ĵi(wi). Then, the following lemma holds, whose proof
can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 1. If the loss function `(·) and the regularizer N(·)
satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively, then Ĵ({wi}i∈S) is
aκ-strongly convex.
To simplify the notation, let κˆ := aκ. With the objective
function Ĵ({wi}i∈S), the whole optimization problem for
finding a common classifier can be stated as follows:
Problem 2.
min
{wi}
Ĵ({wi}i∈S)
s.t. wi = wl, ∀i, l.
Lemma 2. Problem 2 has an optimal solution set {ŵi}i∈S ⊂
W such that ŵopt = ŵi = ŵl,∀i, l.
Lemma 2 can be proved directly from Lemma 1 in [35],
whose condition is satisfied by Lemma 1.
We finally arrive at stating the optimization problem to be
solved in this paper. To this end, for the modified objective
function in (22), we define the perturbed version as in (14)
by J˜i(wi) := Ĵi(wi) + 1nη
T
i wi. Then, the whole objective
function becomes
J˜({wi}i∈S) =
n∑
i=1
[
Ĵi(wi) +
1
n
ηTi wi
]
.
The problem for finding the classifier with randomized labels
and perturbed objective functions is as follows:
Problem 3.
min
{wi}
J˜({wi}i∈S)
s.t. wi = wl, ∀i, l.
For J˜({wi}i∈S), we have the following lemma showing its
convexity properties.
Lemma 3. J˜({wi}i∈S) is κˆ-strongly convex. If N(·) satisfies
that ‖∇2N(·)‖2 ≤ %, then J˜({wi}i∈S) has a (nc3 + a%)-
Lipschitz continuous gradient, where c3 is the bound of
∂`2(·)
∂w2
given in Assumption 1.
The proof can be found in Appendix D. For simplicity,
we denote the Lipschitz continuous gradient of J˜(w) as %J˜ ,
namely, %J˜ := nc3 + a%.
We now observe that Problem 3 associated with the ob-
jective function J˜({wi}i∈S) has an optimal solution set
{w˜i}i∈S ⊂ W where
w˜opt = w˜i = w˜l, ∀i, l. (23)
In fact, this can be shown by an argument similar to Lemma 2,
where Lemma 3 establishes the convexity of the objective
function (as in Lemma 1).
C. Generalization Error Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the the accumulated differ-
ence between the generalization error of trained classifiers
and JP(w?), i.e.,
∑n
i=1 ∆JP(wi(t)). For the analysis, we
use the technique from [38], which considers the problem
of ADMM learning in the presence of erroneous updates.
Here, our problem is more complicated because besides the
erroneous updates brought by primal variable perturbation,
there is also uncertainty in the training data and the objective
functions. All these uncertainties are coupled together, which
brings extra challenges for performance analysis.
We first decompose ∆JP(wi(t)) in terms of different
uncertainties. To do so, we must introduce a new regularized
generalization error associated with the modified loss function
ˆ`(y′,wTx, ) and the noisy data distribution P. Similar to
(18), for a classifier w, it is defined by
JP(w) = E(x,y′)∼P
[
ˆ`(y′,wTx, )
]
+
a
n
N(w).
According to Proposition 2, ˆ`(y′,wTx, ) is an unbiased
estimate of `(y,wTx). Thus, it is straightforward to obtain
the following lemma, whose proof is omitted.
Lemma 4. For a classifier w, we have JP(w) = JP(w).
Now, we can decompose ∆JP(wi(t)) as follows:
∆JP(wi(t)) = JP(wi(t))− JP(w?)
= JP(wi(t))− JP(w?)
= J˜i(wi(t))− J˜i(w˜opt) + Ĵi(w˜opt)− Ĵi(ŵopt)
+ Ĵi(ŵopt)− Ĵi(w?) + JP(wi(t))− Ĵi(wi(t))
+ Ĵi(w
?)− JP(w?) + ηTi (w˜opt −wi(t)). (24)
We will analyze each term in the far right-hand side of (24).
The term w˜opt −wi(t) describes the difference between the
classifier wi(t) and the optimal solution w˜opt to Problem 3.
Before analyzing this difference, we first consider the devia-
tion between the perturbed classifier w˜i(t) and w˜opt, and a
bound for it can be obtained by [38].
Here, we introduce some notations related to the bound. Let
the compact forms of vectors be w˜(t) := [w˜T1 (t) · · · w˜Tn (t)]T,
θ(t) := [θT1 (t) · · ·θTn (t)]T, and η := [ηT1 · · ·ηTn ]T. Also, let
ŵ∗ := [Id · · · Id]T · ŵopt, w˜∗ := [Id · · · Id]T · w˜opt, and
L := 12 (L+ + L−). An auxiliary sequence r(t) is defined
as r(t) :=
∑t
k=0Qw˜(k) with Q :=
(L−
2
) 1
2 [39]. r(t) has
an optimal value ropt, which is the solution to the equation
Qropt +
1
2β∇J˜(w˜opt) = 0.
Further, we define some important parameters to be used
in the next lemma. The first two parameters, b ∈ (0, 1) and
λ1 > 1, are related to the underlying network topology G and
will be used to establish convergence property of the perturbed
ADMM algorithm. Let ϕ := λ1−1λ1
2κˆσ2min(Q)σ
2
min(L+)
%2
J˜
σ2min(L+)+2κˆσ
2
max(L+)
,
where σmax(·) and σmin(·) denote the maximum and minimum
nonzero eigenvalues of a matrix, respectively. Also, we define
M1 and M2 with constant λ2 > 1 as
M1 :=
b(1 + ϕ)σ2min(L+)(1− 1/λ2)
4bσ2min(L+)(1− 1/λ2) + 16σ2max(L)
,
M2 :=
(1− b)(1 + ϕ)σ2min(L+)− σ2max(L+)
4σ2max(L+) + 4(1− b)σ2min(L+)
.
Then, we have the following lemma from [38], which gives
a bound for w˜(t)− w˜∗.
9Lemma 5. Suppose that the conditions of Lemma 3 hold. If
the parameters b and λ1 can be chosen such that
(1− b)(1 + ϕ)σ2min(L+)− σ2max(L+) > 0. (25)
Take β in (17) as β =
√
λ1λ3(λ4−1)%2
J˜
λ4(λ1−1)σ2max(L+)σ2min(Q)
, where
λ4 := 1 +
√
%2
J˜
σ2min(L+)+2κˆσ
2
max(L+)
αλ3%2
J˜
σ2min(L+)
with 0 < α <
min{M1,M2}, and λ3 := 1 + 2κˆσ
2
max(L+)
%2
J˜
σ2min(L+)
. Then, it holds
‖w˜(t)− w˜∗‖22 ≤ Ct
(
H1 +
t∑
k=1
C−kH2‖θ(k)‖22
)
, (26)
where C := (1+4α)σ
2
max(L+)
(1−b)(1+ϕ−4α)σ2min(L+)
, and H1 :=
‖w(0)− w˜∗‖22 + 4(1+4α)σ2max(L+) ‖r(0)− ropt‖
2
2, H2 :=
b(λ2−1)
1−b +
4ϕλ1σ
2
max(L)
σ2
min
(Q)
+σ2max(L+)
(
√
ϕ+
√
2(λ1−1)σ2min(Q)
αλ1λ3%
2
J˜
)2
(1−b)(1+ϕ)(1+ϕ−4α)σ2min(L+)
.
Lemma 5 implies that given a connected graph G and the
objective function in Problem 3, if the parameters b and λ1
satisfy (25), then C in (26) is guaranteed to be less than 1. In
this case, the obtained classifiers will converge to the neigh-
borhood of the optimal solution w˜opt, where the radius of the
neighborhood is limt→∞
∑t
k=1 C
t−kH2‖θ(k)‖22. The modi-
fied ADMM algorithm can achieve different radii depending
on the added noises θ(k). Since many parameters are involved,
to meet the condition (25) may not be straightforward. In
order to make C smaller to achieve better convergence rate,
in addition to the parameters, one may change, for example,
the graph G to make the value σ2max(L+)
σ2min(L+)
smaller.
Theorem 1 to be stated below gives the upper bound of
the accumulated difference
∑n
i=1 ∆JP(wi(t)) in the sense
of expectation. In the theorem, we employ the important
concept of Rademacher complexity [40]. It is defined on the
classifier classW and the collected data used for training, that
is, Radi(W) := 1miEνj
[
supw∈W
∑mi
j=1 νjw
Txi,j
]
, where
ν1, ν2, . . . , νmi are independent random variables drawn from
the Rademacher distribution, i.e., Pr(νj = 1) = Pr(νj =
−1) = 12 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,mi. In addition, we use the notation‖v‖2A to denote the norm of a vector v with a positive definite
matrix A, i.e., ‖v‖2A = vTAv.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the conditions in Lemma 5 are
satisfied and the decaying rate of noise variance is set as
ρ ∈ (0, C). Then, for  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), the aggregated
classifier wi(t) obtained by the privacy-aware ADMM scheme
(15)-(17) satisfies with probability at least 1− δ
E{θ(k)}
{
n∑
i=1
∆JP(wi(t))
}
≤ 1
2t
C
1− C
(
H1 +
ρH2
C − ρ
n∑
i=1
dV 2i
)
+
n
2
R2 +
β
t
[
H3 +
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
+ 2σ2max(Q)
) ∑n
i=1 dV
2
i
1− ρ
]
+
1
nκˆ
R2 + 4
e + 1
e − 1
n∑
i=1
(
c2Radi(W) + 2c1
√
2 ln(4/δ)
mi
)
,
(27)
where H3 = ‖r(0)‖22 + ‖w(0)− w˜∗‖2L+
2
, and the parameters
C, H1, H2 and β are found in Lemma 5.
Proof. In what follows, we evaluate the terms in the far right-
hand side of (24) by dividing them into three groups. The first
is the terms JP(wi(t))− Ĵi(wi(t))+ Ĵi(w?)−JP(w?). We
can bound them from above as
JP(wi(t))− Ĵi(wi(t)) + Ĵi(w?)− JP(w?)
≤ 2 max
w∈W
∣∣∣JP(w)− Ĵi(w)∣∣∣ .
According to Theorem 26.5 in [40], with probability at least
1− δ, we have
max
w∈W
∣∣∣JP(w)− Ĵi(w)∣∣∣
≤ 2Radi(ˆ`◦W) + 4
∣∣∣ˆ`(y′i,j ,wTi xi,j , )∣∣∣√2 ln(4/δ)
mi
,
where Radi(ˆ`◦W) is the Rademacher complexity of W with
respect to ˆ`. Further, by the contraction lemma in [40],
Radi(ˆ`◦W) ≤ cˆ2Radi(W) = c2 e
 + 1
e − 1Radi(W),
where we have used Proposition 2. Also, from (19), we derive∣∣∣ˆ`(y′i,j ,wTi xi,j , )∣∣∣ ≤ e + 1e − 1c1,
where c1 is the bound of the original loss function `(·)
(Assumption 1). Then, it follows that
JP(wi(t))− Ĵi(wi(t)) + Ĵi(w?)− JP(w?)
≤ 4e
 + 1
e − 1
(
c2Radi(W) + 2c1
√
2 ln(4/δ)
mi
)
. (28)
The second group in (24) are the terms about J˜i(·) and
Ĵi(·). In their aggregated forms, by Lemma 2, it holds
J˜(w(t))− J˜(w˜∗) + Ĵ(w˜∗)− Ĵ(ŵ∗) + Ĵ(ŵ∗)− Ĵ(w?)
≤ J˜(w(t))− J˜(w˜∗) + Ĵ(w˜∗)− Ĵ(ŵ∗)
≤ 1
t
t∑
k=1
J˜(w(k))− J˜(w˜∗) + Ĵ(w˜∗)− Ĵ(ŵ∗), (29)
where we have used Jensen’s inequality given the strongly
convex J˜(·). For the first two terms in (29), by Theorem 1 of
[38], we have
1
t
t∑
k=1
J˜(w(k))− J˜(w˜∗) ≤ β
t
‖r(0)‖22 + ‖w(0)− w˜∗‖2L+
2
+
β
t
t∑
k=1
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
‖θ(k)‖22 + 2θ(k)TQr(k)
)
. (30)
Take the expectation on both sides of (30) with respect to
θ(k). Given E{θ(k)}
{‖θ(k)‖22} = ∑ni=1 dV 2i ρk−1, we derive
E{θ(k)}
{
2θ(k)TQr(k)
}
= E{θ(k)}
{
2‖Qθ(k)‖22
}
≤ 2σ2max(Q)
n∑
i=1
dV 2i ρ
k−1,
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where we used E {θ(k)} = 0 and E{θ(k)} {θ(k − 1)θ(k)} =
0. Thus, it follows that
E{θ(k)}
{
t∑
k=1
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
‖θ(k)‖22 + 2θ(k)TQr(k)
)}
≤
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
+ 2σ2max(Q)
) n∑
i=1
dV 2i
t∑
k=1
ρk−1
≤
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
+ 2σ2max(Q)
) ∑n
i=1 dV
2
i
1− ρ .
Then, for (30), we arrive at
E{θ(k)}
{
J˜(w(t))− J˜(w˜∗)
}
≤ β
t
[
H3 +
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
+ 2σ2max(Q)
) ∑n
i=1 dV
2
i
1− ρ
]
. (31)
Next, we focus on the latter two terms in (29). Due to (23),
we have J˜(w˜∗) ≤ J˜(ŵ∗), which yields
Ĵ(w˜∗)− Ĵ(ŵ∗) ≤ 1
n
ηT(w˜∗ − ŵ∗) ≤ 1
n
‖η‖‖w˜∗ − ŵ∗‖,
By Lemma 7 in [14], we obtain ‖w˜∗−ŵ∗‖ ≤ 1n ‖η‖κˆ . It follows
Ĵ(w˜∗)− Ĵ(ŵ∗) ≤ 1
κˆ
‖η‖2
n2
≤ 1
nκˆ
R2, (32)
where R is the bound of noise ηi. Substituting (31) and (32)
into (29), we derive
E{θ(k)}{J˜(w(t))− J˜(w˜∗) + Ĵ(w˜∗)− Ĵ(ŵ∗) + Ĵ(ŵ∗)− Ĵ(w?)}
≤ 1
nκˆ
R2 +
β
t
[
H3 +
(
σ2max(L+)
2σ2max(L−)
+ 2σ2max(Q)
) ∑n
i=1 dV
2
i
1− ρ
]
.
(33)
The third group in (24) is the term ηT(w˜∗ − w(t)). We
have
ηT(w˜∗ −w(t)) = ηT
(
w˜∗ − 1
t
t∑
k=1
(w˜(k)− θ(k))
)
.
Taking the expectation with respect to θ(k), we obtain
E{θ(k)}
{
ηT(w˜∗ −w(t))
}
= E{θ(k)}
{
ηT
(
w˜∗ − 1
t
t∑
k=1
w˜(k)
)}
≤ 1
2
‖η‖22 + E{θ(k)}
 12t2
∥∥∥∥∥
t∑
k=1
(w˜∗ − w˜(k))
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2

≤ 1
2
‖η‖22 + E{θ(k)}
{
1
2t
t∑
k=1
‖w˜∗ − w˜(k)‖22
}
.
By Lemma 5, we have
‖w˜∗ − w˜(k)‖22 ≤ Ct
(
H1 +
t∑
k=1
C−kH2‖θ(k)‖22
)
.
Then, it follows that
E{θ(k)}
{
ηT(w˜∗ −w(t))
}
≤ 1
2
‖η‖22 + 1
2t
E{θ(k)}
{
t∑
k=1
Ct
(
H1 +
t∑
k=1
C−kH2‖θ(k)‖22
)}
≤ n
2
R2 +
1
2t
C
1− C
(
H1 +
ρH2
C − ρ
n∑
i=1
dV 2i
)
,
(34)
where we have used 0 < ρ < C. Substituting (28), (33) and
(34) into (24), we arrive at the bound in (27).
Theorem 1 provides a guidance for both users and servers
to obtain a classification model with desired performance. In
particular, the effects of three uncertainties on the bound of∑n
i=1 ∆JP(wi(t)) have been successfully decomposed. Note
that these effects are not simply superimposed but coupled
together. Specifically, the terms in (27) related to the primal
variable perturbation decrease with iterations at the rate of
O
(
1
t
)
. This also implies that the whole framework achieves
convergence in expectation at this rate.
Compared with [16] and [38], where bounds of
1
t
∑t
k=1 J˜(w(k)) − J˜(w˜∗) are provided, we derive the
difference between the generalization error of the aggregated
classifier w(t) and that of the ideal optimal classifier w?,
which is moreover given in a closed form. The bound in
(27) contains the effect of the unknown data distribution P
while the bound of 1t
∑t
k=1 J˜(w(k)) − J˜(w˜∗) covers only
the role of existing data. Although [15] also considers the
generalization error of found classifiers, no closed form of
the bound is given, and the obtained bound may not decrease
with iterations since the reference classifier therein is not
w? but a time-varying one. In the more centralized setting
of [14], ∆JP(w) is analyzed for the derived classifier w,
but there is no convergence issue since w is perturbed and
published only once.
Moreover, different from the works [14–16] and [38], our
analysis considers the effects of the classifier class W by
Rademacher complexity. Such effects have been used in [40]
in non-private centralized machine learning scenarios. Further-
more, in the privacy-aware (centralized or distributed) frame-
works of [14–16] and the robust ADMM scheme for erroneous
updates [38], there is only one type of noise perturbation, and
the uncertainty in the training data is not considered.
D. Comparisons and Discussions
Here, we compare the proposed framework with existing
schemes from the perspective of privacy and performance, and
discuss how each parameter contributes to the results.
First, we find that the bound in (27) is larger than those
in [14–16] if we adopt the approach in this paper to conduct
performance analysis on these works. This is obvious since
there are more perturbations in our setting. However, as we
have discussed in Section IV-C, these existing frameworks
do not meet the heterogeneous privacy requirements, and
some of them cannot avoid accumulation of privacy losses,
resulting in no protection at all. It should be emphasized
that extra performance costs must be paid when the data
contributors want to obtain stronger privacy guarantee. These
existing frameworks may be better than ours in the sense of
performance, but the premise is that users accept the privacy
preservation provided by them. If users require heterogenous
privacy protection, our framework can be more suitable.
Further, compared with [14–16], [38] and [40], we provide
a more systematic result on the performance analysis in
Theorem 1, where most parameters related to useful measures
of classifiers (also privacy preservation) are included. Servers
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and users can set these parameters as needed, and thus obtain
classifiers which can appropriately balance the privacy and the
performance. We will discuss the roles of these parameters
after some further analysis on the theoretical result.
According to Lemma 5, the classifiers solved by different
servers converge to w˜opt in the sense of expectation. The
performance of w˜opt can be analyzed in a similar way as
in Theorem 1. This is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at
least 1− δ, we have
∆JP(w˜opt)
≤ 4
n
e + 1
e − 1
n∑
i=1
(
c2Radi(W) + 2c1
√
2 ln(4/δ)
mi
)
+
1
nκˆ
R2.
(35)
For the sake of comparison, the next theorem provides a
performance analysis when the privacy-preserving approach in
Phase 2 is removed, and a corresponding result on the bound
of ∆JP(ŵopt) is given in the subsequent corollary.
Theorem 2. For  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), the aggregated
classifier wi(t) obtained by the original ADMM scheme (9)
and (10) satisfies with probability at least 1− δ
n∑
i=1
∆JP(wi(t)) ≤ β
t
(
‖w(0)− ŵ∗‖2L+
2
+ ‖r(0)‖22
)
+ 4
e + 1
e − 1
n∑
i=1
(
c2Radi(W) + 2c1
√
2 ln(4/δ)
mi
)
.
(36)
Corollary 2. For  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at
least 1− δ, we have
∆JP(ŵopt) ≤ 4
n
e + 1
e − 1
n∑
i=1
(
c2Radi(W) + 2c1
√
2 ln(4/δ)
mi
)
.
(37)
It is observed that the bound in (36) is not in expectation
since there is no noise perturbation during the ADMM iter-
ations. It is interesting to note that the convergence rate of
the unperturbed ADMM algorithm is also O( 1t ). This implies
that the modified ADMM algorithm preserves the convergence
speed of the general distributed ADMM scheme.
However, there exists a tradeoff between performance and
privacy protection. Comparing (27) and (36), we find that
the extra terms in (27) are the results of perturbations in
Phase 2. Also, the effect of the objective function perturbation
is reflected in (35), that is, the term 1nκˆR
2. When R (the bound
of ηi) increases, the generalization error of the trained clas-
sifier would increase as well, indicating worse performance.
Similarly, if we use noises with larger initial variances and
decaying rates to perturb the solved classifiers in each iteration,
the bound in (27) will also increase.
Effect of data quality. We observe that the bound of
∆JP(ŵopt) in (37) also appears in (27), (35) and (36). This
bound reflects the effect of users’ reported data, whose labels
are randomized in Phase 1. It can be seen that besides the
probability δ, the bound in (37) is affected by three factors:
PPD , Rademacher complexity Radi(W), and the number of
data samples mi. Here, we discuss the roles of these factors.
For the effect of PPD, we find that when  is small, the
bound will decrease with an increase in . However, when 
is sufficiently large, it has limited influence on the bound. In
particular, by taking →∞, the bound reduces to that for the
optimal solution of Problem 1, where (e+1)/(e−1) goes to
1 in (37). Note that Radi(W) and mi still remain and affect
the performance.
For the effect of Radi(W), we observe that the general-
ization errors of trained classifiers may become larger when
Radi(W) increases. The Rademacher complexity is directly
related to the size of the classifier class W . If there are only a
small number of candidate classifiers inW , the solutions have
a high probability of obtaining smaller deviation between their
generalization errors and the reference generalization error
JP(w?). Nevertheless, we should guarantee the richness of
the class W to make JP(w?) small since w? trained in terms
ofW will have large generalization error. Though the deviation
∆JP(·) may be small, the trained classifiers are not good
predictors due to the bad performance of w?. Thus, setting
an appropriate classifier class is important for obtaining a
classifier with qualified performance.
Finally, we consider the effect of the number of users.
From the bound of ∆JP(ŵopt) in (37), we know that if mi
becomes larger, the last term of the bound will decrease. In
general, more data samples imply access to more information
about the underlying distribution P . Then, the trained classifier
can predict the labels of newly sampled data from P with
higher accuracy. Moreover, it can be seen that the bound is the
average of n local errors generated in different servers. When
new servers participate in the DML framework, these servers
should make sure that they have collected sufficient amount of
training data samples. Otherwise, the bound may not decrease
though the total number of data samples increases. This is
because unbalanced local errors may lead to an increase in
their average, implying larger bound of ∆JP(·).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct experiments to validate the
obtained theoretical results and study the classification per-
formance of the proposed PDML framework. Specifically, we
first use a real-world dataset to verify the convergence property
of the PDML framework and study how key parameters
would affect the performance. Also, we leverage another seven
datasets to verify the classification accuracy of the classifiers
trained by the framework.
A. Experiment Setup
1) Datasets: We use two kinds of publicly available
datasets as described below to validate the convergence prop-
erty and classification accuracy of the PDML.
(i) Adult dataset [41]. The dataset contains census data
of 48,842 individuals, where there are 14 attributes (e.g.,
age, work-class, education, occupation and native-country)
and a label indicating whether a person’s annual income
is over $50,000. After removing the instances with missing
values, we obtain a training dataset with 45,222 samples. To
preprocess the dataset, we adopt unary encoding approach
12
20 40 60
Iteration
0
2
4
6
8
M
ax
im
um
 d
iff
er
en
ce
Modified loss
Perturbed ADMM
(a) Norm of the errors
20 40 60 80 100
Iteration
0
5
10
15
20
Em
pi
ric
al
 ri
sk
s
Modified loss
Perturbed ADMM
Original data
(b) Empirical risks
Fig. 3: The convergence properties of PDML.
to transform the categorial attributes into binary vectors, and
further normalize the whole feature vector to be a vector with
maximum norm of 1. The preprocessed feature vector is a
105-dimensional vector. For the labels, we mark the annual
income over $50,000 as 1, otherwise it is labeled as −1.
(ii) Gunnar Ra¨tsch’s benchmark datasets [42]. There are
thirteen data subsets from the UCI repository in the benchmark
datasets. To mitigate the effect of data quality, we select seven
datasets with the largest data sizes to conduct experiments. The
seven datasets are German, Image, Ringnorm, Banana, Splice,
Twonorm and Waveform, where the numbers of instances are
1,000, 2,086, 7,400, 5,300, 2,991, 7,400 and 5,000, respec-
tively. Each dataset is partitioned into training and test data,
with a ratio of approximately 70% : 30%.
2) Underlying classification approach: Logistic regression
(LR) is utilized for training the prediction model, where the
loss function and regularizer are `LR(yi,j ,wTi xi,j) = log
(
1 +
e−yi,jw
T
i xi,j
)
and N(wi) = 12‖wi‖2, respectively. Then, the
local objective function is given by
Ji(wi) =
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
log
(
1 + e−yi,jw
T
i xi,j
)
+
a
2n
‖wi‖2.
It is easy to check that when the classifier classW is bounded
(e.g., a bounded set W = {w ∈ Rd | ‖w‖ ≤ W}),
`LR(·) satisfies Assumption 1. Due to the convexity property
of N(wi), Ji(wi) is strongly convex. Then, according to
Lemma 2, Problems 2 and 3 have optimal solution sets, and
thus, we can use LR to train the classifiers.
3) Network topology: We consider n = 10 servers collab-
oratively train a prediction model. A connected random graph
is used to describe the communication topology of the 10
servers. The used graph has E = 13 communication links in
total. Each server is responsible for collecting the data from
a group of users, and thus there are 10 groups of users. In
the experiments, we assume that each group has the same
number of users, that is, mi = ml,∀i, l. For example, we
use m = 45, 000 instances sampled from the Adult dataset
to train the classifier, and then each server collects data from
mi = 4, 500 users.
B. Experimental Results with Adult Dataset
Based on the Adult dataset, we first verify the convergence
property of the PDML framework. Fig. 3(a) illustrates the
maximum distances between the norms of arbitrary two clas-
sifiers found by different servers. We set the bound of ηi to 1.
Other settings are the same as those with experiments under
the synthetic dataset. For the sake of comparison, we also
draw the variation curve (with circle markers) of the maximum
distance when the privacy-preserving approach in Phase 2
is removed. We observe that both distances converge to 0,
implying that the consensus constraint is eventually satisfied.
Fig. 3(b) shows the variation of empirical risks (the ob-
jective function in (1)) as iterations proceed. Here, the green
dashed line depicts the final empirical risk achieved by general
ADMM with original data, which we call the reference empiri-
cal risk. There are also two curves showing varying empirical
risks with privacy preservation. Comparing the two curves,
we find that the ADMM with combined noise-adding scheme
preserves the convergence property of the general ADMM
algorithm. Due to the noise perturbations in Phase 2, the
convergence time becomes longer. In addition, it can be seen
that regardless of whether the privacy-preserving approach in
Phase 2 is used, both ADMM schemes cannot achieve the
same final empirical risks with that of the green line, which
is consistent with the analysis in Section V-D.
We then study the effects of the key parameters on the
performance. In Fig. 4(a), we examine the impact of the noise
bound R when the decaying rate ρ is fixed at 0.8. It is observed
that R affects the final empirical risks of the trained classifiers.
The larger the noise bound, the greater the gap between the
achieved empirical risks and the reference value, which is
reconciled with Corollary 1. In Fig. 4(b), we inspect the effect
of Gaussian noise decaying rate ρ when R is fixed at 1. We
find that the convergence time is affected by ρ. A larger ρ
implies that the communicated classifiers are still perturbed by
noises with larger variance even after iterating over multiple
steps. Thus, more iterations are needed to obtain the same final
empirical risk with that of smaller ρ. Such a property can be
derived from the bound in (27).
Fig. 4(c) illustrates the variation of final empirical risks
when the PPD  changes. The final empirical risks decrease
with larger PPD (weaker privacy guarantee), which implies
the tradeoff relation between the privacy protection and the
performance. Further, the extra perturbations in Phase 2 lead
to larger empirical risks for all the PPDs in the experiments.
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TABLE I: Classification accuracy with test data (%)
Dataset Without privacy protection
Modified loss Perturbed ADMM
 = 0.4, R = 0  = 1, R = 0  = 0.4, R = 1  = 0.4, R = 9  = 1, R = 1  = 1, R = 9
German 75.00 71.00 74.00 69.67 64.00 74.33 67.67
Image 75.56 70.13 72.84 69.33 63.10 70.45 65.50
Ringnorm 77.38 73.44 76.82 73.74 66.18 75.77 70.23
Banana 58.22 54.33 56.06 54.28 43.11 55.89 54.44
Splice 56.60 46.84 56.60 54.94 46.39 55.83 52.50
Twonorm 97.90 96.59 97.38 96.51 92.28 97.41 94.77
Waveform 88.93 84.60 87.93 84.07 80.47 87.67 81.73
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Fig. 4: The effects of key parameters.
We also find that when  is large ( > 0.6), the achieved
empirical risks are close to the reference value, and do not
significantly change. Again, the result is consistent with the
analysis of the bound in (37).
C. Classification Accuracy Evaluation
We use the test data of the seven datasets to evaluate
the prediction performance of the trained classifiers, which
is shown in Table I. The classification accuracy is defined
as the ratio that the labels predicted by the trained classifier
match the true labels of test data. For comparison, we present
the classification accuracy achieved by general ADMM with
the original data. For validation of classification accuracy
under the PDML framework, we choose six different sets
of parameter configurations to conduct the experiments. The
specific configurations can be found in the second row of
Table I. We find that lager  and smaller R will generate
better accuracy. According to the theoretical results, the upper
bounds for the differences ∆JP(w˜opt) and ∆JP(ŵopt) will
decrease with lager  and smaller R, implying better perfor-
mance of the trained classifiers. Thus, the bound in Theorem 1
also provides a guideline to choose appropriate parameters to
obtain a prediction model with satisfied classification accuracy.
It is impressive to observe that even under the strongest
privacy setting ( = 0.4, R = 9), the proposed framework
achieves comparable classification accuracy to the reference
precision. We also notice that under the datasets Banana and
Splice, PDML achieves inferior accuracy in all settings. For
a binary classification problem, it is meaningless to obtain a
precision of around 50%. The reason for the poor accuracy
may be that LR is not a suitable classification approach for
these two datasets. Overall, the proposed PDML framework
achieves competitive classification accuracy on the basis of
providing strong privacy protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a privacy-preserving
ADMM-based distributed machine learning framework. By a
local randomization approach, data contributors obtain self-
controlled DP protection for the most sensitive labels and
the privacy guarantee will not decrease as ADMM iterations
proceed. Further, a combined noise-adding method has been
designed for perturbing the ADMM algorithm, which simul-
taneously preserves privacy for users’ feature vectors and
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strengthens protection for the labels. Lastly, the performance
of the proposed PDML framework has been analyzed in theory
and validated by extensive experiments.
For future investigations, we will study the joint privacy-
preserving effects of the local randomization approach and
the combined noise-adding method. Moreover, it is interesting
while challenging to extend the PDML framework to the non-
empirical risk minimization problems. When users allocate
distinct sensitive levels to different attributes, we are interested
in designing a new privacy-aware scheme providing heteroge-
neous privacy protections for different attributes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let d′ = (x, y′) be the reported data of a user with arbitrary
data sample d = (x, y) drawn from P . Then we have d′ =
M(d). Suppose that the user’s data sample has label y1 =
1, which is denoted by d1 = (x, 1). By (12) and (13), the
probability that the user reports y1 to the server is
Pr[y′1 = 1 | y1] = 1− p =
e
1 + e
.
Similarly, if the user’s original label is y2 = −1, i.e., d2 =
(x,−1), we have
Pr[y′2 = 1 | y2] = p =
1
1 + e
.
Then, we further have the relations as follows:
Pr[y′1 = −1 | y1] =
1
1 + e
,Pr[y′2 = −1 | y2] =
e
1 + e
.
With a slight abuse of notation, we view label “−1” as “0”
below. Note that under this case, the observation set O in
Definition 1 is the user’s reported data d′. Then, for any d′
with feature vector x and arbitrary label y′, we have
Pr[d′ |d1]
Pr[d′ |d2] ≤ maxy′∈{1,0}
(1− p)y′ · p1−y′
py′ · (1− p)1−y′ =
1− p
p
= e,
where we use the relation p ∈ (0, 12 ).
B. Proof of Proposition 2
(i) According to (12), we have
Pr[y′i,j = yi,j | yi,j ] = 1− p =
e
1 + e
,
Pr[y′i,j = −yi,j | yi,j ] = p =
1
1 + e
,
where we have used Proposition 1. Then, it follows that
Ey′i,j
[
ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , )
]
= Pr[y′i,j = yi,j | yi,j ]ˆ`(yi,j ,wTi xi,j , )
+ Pr[y′i,j = yi,j | − yi,j ]ˆ`(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j , )
=
1
e + 1
[
e ˆ`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) + ˆ`(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j , )
]
.
(38)
By (19), we obtain
e ˆ`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) + ˆ`(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j , )
=
e
e − 1
[
e`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j)− `(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j)
]
+
1
e − 1
[
e`(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j)− `(yi,j ,wTi xi,j)
]
= (e + 1)`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j). (39)
Substituting (39) into (38), we arrive at
Ey′i,j
[
ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , )
]
= `(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j).
(ii) The derivative of ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ) with respect to wi
is given by
∂ ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , )
∂wi
=
e
e − 1
∂`(yi,j ,w
T
i xi,j)
∂wi
− 1
e − 1
∂`(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j)
∂wi
.
Then, we have∣∣∣∣∣∂ ˆ`(y′i,j ,wTi xi,j , )∂wi
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ e

e − 1
∣∣∣∣∂`(yi,j ,wTi xi,j)∂wi
∣∣∣∣+ 1e − 1
∣∣∣∣∂`(−yi,j ,wTi xi,j)∂wi
∣∣∣∣
≤ e
 + 1
e − 1c2.
This bound gives the Lipschitz constant of ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , ).
C. Proof of Lemma 1
According to Assumption 2, N(·) is doubly differentiable.
By Taylor’s Theorem, we have
N(w1) = N(w2) +∇N(w1)T(w2 −w1)
+
1
2
(w2 −w1)T∇2N(w1)(w2 −w1) + o
(‖w2 −w1‖22) ,
where ∇N(·) and ∇2N(·) denote the gradient and the second-
order gradient, respectively. Due to (2), we derive
(w2 −w1)T∇2N(w1)(w2 −w1) ≥ κ‖w2 −w1‖22,
which implies ∇2N(w) ≥ κ. For ∀i, let f(wi) := Ĵi(wi) −
aκ
2n‖wi‖22, and then we have
∂2f(wi)
∂w2i
=
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
∂2 ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j , )
∂w2i
+
a
n
∇2N(wi)− aκ
n
≥ 1
mi(e − 1)
mi∑
j=1
[
e
∂2`(y′i,j , ·)
∂w2i
− ∂
2`(−y′i,j , ·)
∂w2i
]
=
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
∂2`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j)
∂w2i
≥ 0,
where we have used Assumption 1. This relation also implies
that f(wi) is convex. Then, we obtain ∀w1,w2 ∈ W ,
f(w1) ≥ f(w2) +∇f(w2)T(w1 −w2). It follows that
Ĵi(w1)− aκ
2n
‖w1‖22 ≥Ĵi(w2) + aκ
2n
‖w2‖22
+∇Ĵi(w2)T(w1 −w2)− aκ
n
wT2w1.
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Rearrange the above equation so that
Ĵi(w1)− Ĵi(w2) ≥ ∇Ĵi(w2)T(w1 −w2) + aκ
2n
‖w1 −w2‖22,
which indicates Ĵi(wi) is aκn -strongly convex. Since
Ĵ({wi}i∈S) =
∑n
i=1 Ĵi(wi), it follows that Ĵ({wi}i∈S) is
aκ-strongly convex.
D. Proof of Lemma 3
The strongly convex property of J˜({wi}i∈S) can be proved
directly from Lemma 1. For the Lipschitz continuous gradi-
ent, we consider the compact form of classifiers, as w =
[wT1 · · ·wTn ]T. We have J˜(w) = J˜({wi}i∈S). The second
derivative of J˜(w) with respect to w is given by
∂2J˜(w)
∂w2
=
n∑
i=1
∂2J˜i(wi)
∂w2i
=
n∑
i=1
[
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
∂2 ˆ`(y′i,j , ·)
∂w2i
+
a
n
∇2N(wi)
]
.
For
∂2 ˆ`(y′i,j ,w
T
i xi,j ,)
∂w2i
, we have∣∣∣∣∣∂2 ˆ`(y′i,j , ·)∂w2i
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1e − 1
∣∣∣∣e ∂2`(y′i,j , ·)∂w2i − ∂
2`(−y′i,j , ·)
∂w2i
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∂2`(y′i,j , ·)∂w2i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c3.
Due to ‖∇2N(·)‖2 ≤ %, we derive∣∣∣∣∣∂2J˜(w)∂w2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
n∑
i=1
[
c3 +
a
n
%
]
= nc3 + a%.
This also gives the Lipschitz continuous gradient of J˜(w).
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